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XU, YIFENG
THE NECKLACE 
VIEW OF THE SELF
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I provide a framework for accounting for the self, based on 
a reconstruction of Galen Strawson’s “theory of SESMETs,” or the Pearl 
view, with Barry Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. I argue that the 
framework I provide adequately accounts for the self and is preferable to solely 
adopting either Strawson’s or Dainton’s theory. I call my reconstruction the 
“Necklace” view of the self.
In everyone’s daily experience of the world, there seems to be an 
“I” that exists. It is usually assumed that person must feel, understand, 
and act from the perspective of their “I,” and the “I” is “the self” 
of that person. Many philosophers have been concerned about the 
questions, “What is the self?” or “Who am I?” and a popular claim 
today is that one experiences one’s self as a narrative. Galen Strawson 
argues against the narrativity view in favour of his materialist “theory 
of SESMETs (subjects of experience that are single mental things).”1 I 
consider Strawson’s theory important, except for the counterintuitive 
consequence that a person’s past selves are completely different selves 
from the person’s current self. Although I agree with Strawson that 
self-experience does not necessarily have the nature of narrativity, and 
that one’s self could often be episodic, I regard the theory of SESMETs 
as problematic because it eliminates a first-personal claim on past selves 
in one’s history. Since I regard the feature of first-person to be essential 
to any account of the self, Strawson’s theory of the self cannot be a 
complete one. This paper endeavours to solve this incompleteness by 
arguing for two states of the self—the diachronic self and the episodic 
self as one and the same self under different conditions—by combining 
Strawson’s SESMETs theory and Barry Dainton’s “continuous 
consciousness thesis.”
Before making criticisms of Strawson’s theory, I shall briefly 
introduce the background of the SESMETs. Strawson challenges the 
commonly-held view that there is no such thing as the self, and “the 
self” we speak of in our language is merely a fictional character used 
for descriptions about human life experience. According to Strawson, 
such a categorisation of the self—together with the presupposition 
behind the categorisation that self-experience is a narrative about a 
person—is mistaken. First, a person does not necessarily have the self-
experience which is like a human-life-long narrative, and it is wrong to 
make the normative claim that one should have one’s self-experience 
as a narrative. There are people who do not consider their selves “as a 
1 Galen Strawson, “The Self and the SESMET,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 6, no. 4 (1999): 118; See also Galen Strawson, “Against 
Narrativity,” Ratio (new series) XVII 4, no. 0034–0006 (2004): 428-52.
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human being as a whole” but “principally as an inner mental entity.”2 
Strawson insists that, for such a person, there certainly exists a “self,” 
and the person’s self is not considered as a narrative.3 Second, Strawson 
denies the claim that the self is fictional. He argues for the existence of 
the self from a material stance, starting with an investigation of people’s 
phenomenological experience about “the mental self” and ends with 
what he calls “the Pearl view,” which “suggests that many mental selves 
exist, one at a time and one after another, like pearls on a string… 
each is a fully distinct existence, an individual physical thing or object, 
though they may exist for considerably different lengths of time.”4 He 
believes this to be the best one can do to explain what the self is if there 
is such a (material) thing as “the self.”5 
From my point of view, Strawson deserves credit in arguing against 
the narrative claim about self-experience and the well-organised 
investigation of the self as SESMETs. Nevertheless, I disagree with 
him on the conclusion that his Pearl view is a full account of the self, 
even from a materialist stance which Strawson holds. The problem 
with such a conclusion is due to Strawson’s claim that the self is not 
diachronically considered. By “diachronically considered,” I mean the 
feature of long-term continuity which Strawson finds as well as rejects 
in the narrativity camp’s account of the self.6 Strawson distinguishes 
two forms of self-experience: the diachronic form—“one naturally 
figures oneself, considered as a self, as something that was there in 
the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future”—and the 
episodic form—“one does not figure oneself, considered as a self, as 
something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the 
(further) future.”7 As Strawson argues against narrativity, he not only 
argues that the self is a (material) thing rather than a fictional character, 
but he also denies the idea that the self should be considered to persist 
over a long time. The “long time” here might sound controversial. The 
narrativity camp suggests the time to be human-life-long, but my use 
of diachronic self in this paper—though within the definition given by 
2 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 429.
3 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 428-52.
4 Strawson, “The Self,” 405-28. By arguing from the material stance, 
Strawson further clarifies that, according to his materialism, the mental 
is within the physical realm—which is the only realm—but belongs to the 
experiential aspects of the physical, distinct from the non-experiential 
aspects. In other words, Strawson denies the claim made by some 
materialists that experience is merely neurons firing. 
5 Strawson, “The Self,” 405-28. Strawson denies the claim made by some 
materialists that experience is merely neurons firing. He clarifies that, 
according to his materialism, the mental is within the physical realm—
which is the only realm—but belongs to the experiential aspects of the 
physical, distinct from the non-experiential.
6 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 430.
7 Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” 430.
Strawson—is only to contrast Strawson’s episodic self, and it does not 
have such an implication.
In “Against Narrativity,” Strawson makes the convincing 
argument that many people experience their selves synchronically (viz. 
they experience their selves as something only at present and not in 
the past or future), and their self-experiences are episodic. So far, his 
claim sounds plausible and adequate. However, in “The Self,” Strawson 
radicalises that claim by asserting that the self should only be considered 
as “the single mental self at any given time without thinking of the 
self as something that has long-term continuity.”8 Our consciousness, 
according to Strawson, constantly slips from the consciousness about 
the self from time to time, meaning that every person must have 
multiple episodic self-experiences no matter how long each episode is. 
Since each phenomenological experience of the self must be episodic 
instead of diachronic, the metaphysical self must be accounted for 
episodically.9 In other words, it is psychological continuity through 
each episode—i.e. the continuity in the mental state of experiencing 
the self—that defines the persistence of the self. It seems that Strawson 
presupposes the sufficiency of cognitive phenomenology to the 
metaphysical account of the self. Therefore, he comes up with the Pearl 
view. For Strawson, the self is identical to the episodic self, and each 
episodic self is independent from all other selves. Although Strawson 
uses the analogy of a pearl string, it would not make any difference if he 
simply called the selves “pearls without a string”—which might even 
be more accurate. If one insists on interpreting “the string,” Strawson 
himself seems to give a suggestion, which is that “the string” represents 
the history of the biological human being who carries all the mental 
selves.10 However, based on the SESMETs theory, such a string analogy 
seems redundant, because the string is nothing more than a temporal 
recorder of the selves that are argued to be independent existents. A 
person’s history as a mere timeline would have no effect on any of the 
person’s episodic selves. Correspondingly, the existence and any change 
of the string has no effect on any of the pearls. 
We shall observe a radical separation made by Strawson’s SESMETs 
theory, which is the separation of a person’s episodic self-experiences 
in the past or future from the person at present. Because Strawson has 
8 Strawson, “The Self,” 423.
9 Strawson, “The Self,” 421-4.
10 Strawson does not explain how the string works in the article, but from 
his footnote 30, he seems to suggest that Dennett’s account of the self 
would be analogous to a pearl string with only one long pearl (Strawson, 
“The Self,” 425). Since Dennett treats the self as the “centre” of a human 
narrative, it is probably the case that Strawson makes human history 
analogous to the string of a pearl string (Dennett, “The Self as a Center of 
Narrative Gravity”).
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made the “string of the pearls” nothing but a temporal axis, it becomes 
the case that, for example, I cannot claim the episodic self which is 
experienced by the teenage me, YF, from 14 to 15 years old to be “a 
self of mine” since “my self” can only refer to the episodic self I am 
experiencing now, and “my self” is an independent existent from “that 
self” of the teenage YF. The only relationship between the two selves is 
that they occupy a sequential timeline—which is the history of YF—so 
that they do not overlap. There seems to be no difference between my 
recognition of the teenage YF’s self and my recognition of any random 
self which existed around my teenage years. Such a consequence is 
certainly counterintuitive. Based on the fact that Strawson’s Pearl 
view on its own must face this problem, is there a way to resolve the 
counterintuitiveness so that the string of mental selves share a more 
integrated relationship than mere temporal continuity, as well as 
preserve the distinctions between each two episodic selves? 
I suggest a reconstruction of the Pearl view to achieve the 
aim, by replacing what “the string of the necklace” represents. 
On the basis of this idea, I bring in Barry Dainton’s “continuous 
consciousness thesis” about the self and combine it with 
Strawson’s SESMETs to become a complete view of the self. 
Dainton defines the consciousness stream to be the potential for 
experience, and he claims that a person’s self persists as long as 
their consciousness stays in a continuous stream, despite what 
happens to their physical body as a consciousness carrier in the 
middle of the stream. In other words, a person’s self can persist 
even though the person has experiences without a self-experience 
temporally in between the consciousness stream, so long as the 
potential for experience is continuous. Dainton regards his view 
as having an implication that the self is “nothing other than the 
potential… a continuous potential for experience”—namely, 
nothing more than a continuous consciousness stream.11 Notice 
that, according to this claim, phenomenal continuity is sufficient 
for the persistence of a self, and psychological continuity (which 
Strawson argues for) is not necessary. Although such a view is 
different from Strawson’s SESMETs view, Dainton’s theory of the 
self in its nature does not deny SESMETs as selves but accounts 
for another type of the self; I call it “the diachronic self” because 
it fits into Strawson’s definition of the diachronic form of self-
experience and it contrasts with Strawson’s episodic self. Besides, 
Dainton’s theory holds a neutral position on whether the self 
is a material thing in the Strawsonian sense, because it would 
depend on whether experience—which the self is capable of being 
11 Barry Dainton, Self, trans. Wang, Youlu (Shanghai: Shanghai Literature & 
Art Publishing House, 2016), 89; 95.
conscious of—is material, so Dainton’s theory certainly does not 
challenge Strawson’s materialist stance.12
All these features in Dainton’s theory provide the possibility for 
a reconstruction of the Pearl view. Instead of regarding Dainton’s and 
Strawson’s theories as different views on one thing (the self), I suggest 
that we should regard them as two states of the self: the episodic 
self and the diachronic self. Since it is a reconstruction of the Pearl 
view, I choose to use an analogy of “a pearl necklace:” the pearls on 
the necklace represent episodic selves that Strawson argues for (the 
SESMETs), and the string of the necklace represents the continuous 
potential for experience shared by the SESMETs. When I say that 
the diachronic self and the episodic self are two states, I mean that 
they are essentially the same self—the consciousness that is capable of 
experiencing—but under different conditions; the diachronic self is 
the whole stream of consciousness which can potentially be the subject 
of all experiences including self-experience, while an episodic self is 
the same consciousness only at the time of being the subject of a self-
experience. What the string provides is a more integrated relationship 
between the episodic selves, meaning that the episodic selves on a 
same necklace are not only linked by a sequential history but also 
connected by a co-consciousness (i.e. the sole continuous potential for 
experiences). Although my recognition of my present self is distinct 
from my recognition of the teenage YF’s self psychologically, it is a 
distinction between episodic selves but not necessarily a distinction 
between diachronic selves. As long as my consciousness at present is still 
the same potential for experience as the teenage YF’s consciousness, I 
share the same diachronic self with the teenage YF.  
The reconstruction also survives several concerns about what 
can happen to a person’s physical body. For example, a dreamless 
sleep would cause an interruption to a psychological continuity so 
that the episodic self before the sleep would be independent from the 
episodic self after the sleep. Using the pearl necklace analogy, these two 
episodic selves are represented by two individual pearls. Nevertheless, 
the two pearls can still be connected by the necklace string by being 
the same diachronic self as long as the two episodic selves constitute a 
continuous consciousness stream. More cases are suggested by Dainton 
such as mental transfer between physical bodies, space transmission, 
and transhumanism through biological technologies.13 For all of these 
cases, there are disputes on whether one’s self can be kept after such 
changes are made to one’s physical body. The Necklace view gives an 
assertive answer: the diachronic self persists as long as the consciousness 
12 Dainton, Self, 90-216.
13 Dainton, Self, 141-216. 
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is continuous, and the episodic self persists as long as the psychological 
cognition is continuous. From this answer we shall see that the self is 
freed from any temporal physical carrier of it, because the persistence 
of the self does not depend on the persistence of any human body (or 
transhuman body). A self may perish even though the human body 
is maintained (e.g. if one’s consciousness stream ends as one’s human 
body enters the vegetative state, the self no longer persists). On the 
contrary, a self may persist—diachronically, or both diachronically and 
episodically—though the physical carrier is destroyed.
The idea of reconstructing Strawson’s theory roots in the concern that 
an account of the self—which I take as an attempt to answer the question, 
“Who am I?”—should be thought about from an “I-perspective.” If 
we accept the claim given by the narrativity camp that the self is merely 
a fictional character used in a narrative, we would be committed to 
accounting “who I am” from a completely third-personal view: whatever 
we say about ourselves, we would speak as a storyteller describing a series 
of events. To me, this is absurd. Strawson, aiming at a metaphysical account 
of the self, starts his argument from everyone’s self-experience. From this 
point, I think Strawson is at least on a more correct path. The endeavour I 
made to reconstruct Strawson’s theory in this paper has been based on the 
will to make the theory more plausible so that we could apply it to answer 
the question “Who am I?” from an I-perspective. However, one may find 
an underlying assumption inherent in all three theories—Strawson’s view, 
Dainton’s view, my Necklace view—that the persistence of the self is 
objectively and, therefore, third-personally verifiable. The question would 
then become, “Since it is agreed that the feature of first-person is essential 
to the self, is it even possible for one to talk about someone else’s self?” The 
Necklace view clearly suggests that we can at least verify the existence and 
persistence of any self, but if one holds the idea that a person’s self should 
not be accountable by anyone but the person, one would be likely to deny 
the possibility. Leke Adeofe, for example, spells out his concern in the 
article “Personal Identity in African Metaphysics:” 
Western metaphysics… formulations of schemata for continuity theories…
neglect the first-person perspective…Yet concerns about, say, my personal 
identity, are about me, and one would expect personal identity discussions 
to reflect this subjective aspect of the issue…there is nothing personal about 
personal identity without the person.14 
The Necklace view would surely count as one of the “Western 
metaphysics” Adeofe refers to. According to Adeofe’s concern, our attempt 
to account the self has been mistaken from the very beginning because we 
14 Leke Adeofe, “Personal Identity in African Metaphysics,” African 
Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, ed. Lee M. Brown (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
should not have regarded the self to be accountable fully from a third-
person perspective at all. Nevertheless, if we assume that the self can be 
accounted for from a third-person perspective, the framework provided by 
the “Necklace view” is more adequate than either Strawson’s SESMETs or 
Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. 
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